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ABSTRACT 
 
Cloud computing has become a popular choice as an 
alternative to investing new IT systems. When making 
decisions on adopting cloud computing related solutions, 
security has always been a major concern. This article 
summarizes security concerns in cloud computing and 
proposes five service deployment models to ease these 
concerns. The proposed models provide different security 
related features to address different requirements and 
scenarios and can serve as reference models for 
deployment. 
 
 
KEYWORDS: Cloud Computing, Deployment Models, 
Security Concerns, Cloud Security 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the identifying characters of cloud computing is 
that computing is delivered via the Internet as services. 
Computing and IT resources are encapsulated as services, 
hiding all the details of implementation, deployment, 
maintenance and administration. Computing will be 
shifted from on-premise systems to remote systems and 
users are connected to the IT infrastructure via the Internet. 
Individual organizations will lose their control of their IT 
systems to some extent, as the IT infrastructure is 
provided over the Internet and is likely leased from cloud 
operators. 
 
With cloud computing, deployment of IT systems and data 
storage is changed from on-premises user-owned IT 
infrastructures to off-premises third-party IT 
infrastructures. Having the whole IT systems and data on 
infrastructures with limited controls creates an obstacle 
for migrating traditional IT systems and data into clouds, 
as users have the following concerns, 
 
 Limited control over the IT infrastructure may incur 
security issues. 
 Having the whole IT system and data on a single 
cloud may give the cloud operator excessive power 
for controlling and modifying users’ IT system and 
data. 
 
This article aims to develop deployment models for cloud 
computing based applications for addressing the security 
related concerns in cloud computing. We propose five 
different deployment models, which present the 
architecture for deploying IT systems based on cloud 
computing across multiple cloud providers. The proposed 
deployment models can address different issues that users 
are concerned about when deploying IT systems over 
cloud computing. 
 
This article is organized is as follows. Section 2 identifies 
the security concerns that users have when adopting cloud 
computing. Section 3 surveys the related work. Section 4 
presents five different deployment models to address the 
security concerns. Section 5 summarizes the security 
features provided by the models. Section 6 concludes the 
article and suggests possible future research. 
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2. CLOUD SECURITY CONCERNS 
 
Security concerns have been raised due to the new 
computing model introduced by cloud computing, which 
is characterized by off-premises computing, lost control of 
IT infrastructure, service-oriented computing, and 
virtualization, and so on. Security concerns from users can 
be briefly summarized as follows. 
 
 Fault tolerance and service availability. When 
keeping data at remote systems owned by others, 
data owners may suffer from system failures of the 
service provider, as system failures will mean that 
data will become unavailable if the data depends on 
a single service provider. Similarly, when deploying 
IT systems over a single cloud, services may be 
unavailable if the cloud goes out of operation. 
 Data migration. Users that adopt cloud computing 
may subject to the risk that their data cannot be 
migrated to other clouds. Without the capability of 
migrating data to other clouds, users may be forced 
to stay with a cloud if they have considerable 
dependence on the data. 
 Data confidentiality and integrity. Data generated by 
cloud computing services are normally kept in the 
clouds as well. Keeping data in the clouds means 
users may lose control of their data and rely on 
cloud operators to enforce access control [23, 2], 
thus they may not be able to prevent unauthorized 
disclosure or malicious modification of their data.  
 
These concerns have been identified in several earlier 
works [16, 2]. Armbrust et al. [2]. considered these 
concerns as the top three obstacles to growth of cloud 
computing, listed as Availability of Services, Data Lock-
In, and Data Confidentiality and Auditability. 
 
3. RELATED WORK 
 
Extensive research efforts have been put into cloud 
computing and its related technologies, resulting in 
several well acknowledged cloud computing theories and 
technologies, including MapReduce [10]  and its 
implementation Apache Hadoop [1], Microsoft Dryad 
[15], Condor DAGman [8], Eucalyptus [18], Nimbus [17], 
Reservoir [3], and CARMEN [6]. 
 
Various security related issues and concerns in cloud 
computing have been identified and are studied, including 
data privacy [19, 20, 16], data protection [9], access 
control [13, 7, 16], availability [24], authentication [25], 
scalability [27]. 
 
Armbrust et al. [2] identified ten obstacles to growth of 
cloud computing. The top three obstacles are actually very 
close to the concerns identified in Section 2, which are the 
issues that our proposed deployment models try to address. 
 
Research in security patterns has established a structural 
way and a proven practice for secure system designs and 
implementations. They provide guidelines as well as 
knowledge that is proven and standardized [22, 12, 11, 5]. 
 
Domain security is a method developed by Qinetiq to 
develop architectural models for applications based on 
security requirements [14]. The architectures generated by 
the Domain Security method focus on the software 
engineering aspect of systems to implement, instead of 
security protocols, cryptographic operations, and so on.  
 
4. REFERENCE DEPLOYMENT MODELS 
 
In the following, we present five deployment models that 
address users’ security concerns with cloud computing.  
 
4.1. Separation Model 
 
On the adoption of cloud computing, users are putting 
their applications and data onto a remote system that is not 
owned or controlled by them. The remote system operator 
has the complete power to control users’ applications and 
data.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Separation Model 
 
Figure 1 demonstrates a possible design based on the 
concept of separation of duty for cloud computing 
targeting a most basic case where data need to be 
processed and stored. The main idea is to have two 
independent services responsible for data processing and 
data storage. Data are presented to users and are 
processed by the Data Processing Service. When the data 
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need to be stored, they are handed over to the Cloud 
Storage Service, which will make the data persistent and 
ready for retrieval in the future.  
 
To implement the separation model shown above, the 
following requirements must be met,  
 
 At least two independent service providers are 
involved.  
 The services should be provided by different 
providers respectively.  
 Each service should be responsible for only one of 
the critical processes involved in a transaction. 
 
The Separation Model mandates at least two different 
cloud computing service providers be involved in a 
transaction. To some extent, this prevents some frauds and 
errors by preventing any single service provider from 
having excessive control over the transactions.  
 
4.2. Availability Model 
 
Cloud computing users are normally concerned with 
service availability. Service providers may go out of 
service unexpectedly. If a single service provider going 
out of service could jeopardize the services users depend 
on, users will be seriously concerned about the availability 
of the services they need.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. The Availability Model 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the availability model built on top of a 
cloud infrastructure. With the availability model, a user 
can work on her data via a data processing service, and 
the data will be kept on a cloud storage service. To ensure 
the availability of the services, there are at least two 
independent data processing services, Data Processing 
Service A and Data Processing Service B respectively, 
and two independent data storage services, Cloud Storage 
Service C and Cloud Storage Service D respectively. 
Either one of the data processing services can have access 
to the data on either one of the cloud storage services. 
Data are replicated and synchronized via a Replication 
Service.  
The Availability model imposes redundancy on both data 
processing and cloud storage. Hence there is no single 
point of failure with respect to data access. When a data 
processing service or a cloud storage service experiences 
failure, there is always a backup service present to ensure 
the availability of the data.  
 
4.3. Migration Model 
 
When data on clouds can only stay on the clouds where 
they are kept, users will be forced to stay with the clouds 
unless they decide to give up their data. This is not an 
acceptable situation.  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Migration Model 
 
Figure 3 demonstrates the Migration model where the 
migration of data is guaranteed. Users process their data 
via a Data Processing Service, where the data are kept on 
Cloud Storage Service A. The Cloud Data Migration 
Service can interact with Cloud Storage Service A and 
another cloud storage service, namely Cloud Storage 
Service B. The Cloud Data Migration Service can move 
data from Cloud Storage Service A to Cloud Storage 
Service B, and vice versa. By being able to move data 
from Cloud Storage Service A to Cloud Storage Service B, 
users need not worry about their data being excessively 
controlled by a cloud provider, knowing that they can 
switch to another service provider by moving the data out 
from the current cloud storage service provider to another.  
 
4.4. Tunnel Model 
 
It is necessary to isolate the two service providers of the 
Separation Model by cutting all the direct communication 
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between them. Neither of the service providers should be 
able to identify each other. In this case, collusion can be 
prevented and filtering can be imposed on the 
communication between the two service providers.  
 
 
 
Figure 4. Tunnel Model 
 
 
Figure 4 demonstrates the Tunnel Model. The Tunnel 
model introduces a tunnel service located between the 
Data Processing Service and the Data Storage Service. 
The tunnel servers as a communication channel between 
the Data Processing Service and the Cloud Storage 
Service. It is responsible for providing an interface for the 
two services to interact with each other, for manipulating 
and retrieving data. The tunnel can in fact be implemented 
as a service as well.  
 
With the Tunnel Model, the Data Processing Service 
manipulates data based on the interface provided by the 
Data Tunneling Service. The Cloud Storage Service will 
not be able to relate the data it keeps with a specific data 
processing service. The Tunnel Model makes it extremely 
difficult for the Data Processing Service to collude with 
the Cloud Storage service for fraud.  
 
4.5. Cryptography Model 
 
For critical applications, the security of data, especially 
confidentiality and integrity, are key requirements. Data 
confidentiality and integrity are in most cases dependent 
on cryptography support.  
 
 
 
Figure 5. Cryptography Model 
 
The Cryptography Model, as illustrated by Figure 5, 
augments the Tunnel Model with a Cryptography Service, 
which provides support for cryptographic operations on 
data. The Data Processing Service feeds data to the Data 
Tunneling Service for persistence. The Data Tunneling 
Service will invoke the Cryptography Service to perform a 
cryptographic operation on the data before handing the 
data over to the Cloud Storage Service. Thus the data kept 
by the Cloud Storage Service are cryptographically 
processed, meaning that they could be ciphertext that can 
only be read by those who have the decryption key, or 
they could be data augmented with digital signatures or 
message authentication codes, and so on, depending on 
the security requirements.  
 
With the Cryptography Model, data can be stored in their 
cryptographically processed form. As the Data Tunneling 
Service hides the Cryptography Service from the Data 
Processing Service and the Cloud Storage Service, the 
cryptographic operations are transparent to the Data 
Processing Service and the Cloud Storage Service. The 
Data Processing Service and the Cloud Storage Service 
will not have access to the data without the cryptography 
key. Data access, such as reading and modifying the data, 
could be well protected by the cryptography key. In the 
case of encrypted data, the decryption key will be required. 
While in the case of digital signed data, all modification 
will need to be validated by producing new signatures 
with the needed keys.  
 
5. MODEL ANALYSIS 
 
Figure 6 shows the relationship between the models 
discussed in Section 4. The relations can be summarized 
as follows.  
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Figure 6. Relations between the Security Models 
 
The Separation Model is the base model for all the other 
four models. It separates data storage from data 
processing, requiring at least two independent cloud 
computing providers to process data and to store data 
respectively. This can help ease users’ concerns on having 
a single provider to have complete control over the data 
and the services they use.  
 
The Availability Model introduces redundancy into the 
Separation Model, in both the data processing and the 
data storage, enabling the tolerance of a single service 
provider.  
 
The Tunnel Model enhances the Separation Model by 
using a Tunnel Service to impose an isolation between the 
Data Processing Service and the Cloud Storage Service. 
The Tunnel Service prevents collusion by cutting the 
direct communications between the Data Processing 
Service and the Cloud Storage Service.  
 
The Cryptography Model augments the Tunnel Model 
with cryptography support, such as data encryption, 
decryption, and digital signing. The Cryptography Model 
allows secure data storage transparent to Date Processing 
Service.  
 
Note that, in Table 1, SM, AM, MM, TM, CM stand for 
Separation Model, Availability Model, Migration Model, 
Tunnel Model, and Cryptography Model respectively. 
Each of the five proposed models focus on different 
aspects of the security requirements, where the Separation 
Model serves as the base model for the other four models.  
 
The proposed deployment models are different from 
existing work in the following aspects. Firstly, the 
techniques employed are mostly on the deployment level. 
Most of the previous work focus on implementation levels, 
such as cryptography protocols and algorithms [25, 23], 
design patterns for system design and implementation 
[12, 11], and internal control mechanisms [7, 9]. 
 
Secondly, the proposed models rely on inter-cloud 
interaction and require multiple clouds to cooperate. 
While existing work mostly investigate the techniques that 
can be used within a single system, such as the 
architecture for a network [21, 26], or techniques for 
building middleware or services [4, 11].  
 
Table 1. Feature Summary 
 
 
  
Thirdly, the proposed models are user oriented. Design 
and implementation techniques and methods are 
development oriented and are opaque for users. The 
deployment models require the cooperation of multiple 
clouds and create user awareness on it. By doing this, 
users’ trust in deploying IT systems on cloud computing 
would be increased.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
This article identifies the security concerns that users may 
have when adopting cloud computing, including fault 
tolerance and service availability, data migration, and data 
confidentiality and integrity. To eliminate these security 
concerns, five deployment models are proposed and 
described in detail, showing various architecture of 
deploying IT systems on cloud computing infrastructure. 
These deployment models are developed to address the 
security issues raised by the identified security concerns.  
 
The proposed models are not without limitations. As the 
proposed models are at deployment architecture level, 
they do not include specific protocols and algorithms that 
can provide supports for confidentiality and integrity at 
cryptography level. Corresponding design patterns and 
interfaces should also be developed to allow cloud based 
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applications be deployed on clouds in the manners 
specified by the proposed models.  
 
The contribution of this article is as follows. Firstly, This 
article identifies the three most important user concerns 
with respect to adopting cloud computing. We argue that 
these concerns are the major obstacles for users to adopt 
cloud computing. Secondly, this article proposes to 
eliminate the user concerns by using specific architecture 
for the deployment of IT systems on cloud computing. 
Thirdly, this article proposes five deployment models, 
each of which is developed to tackle specific issues raised 
by the users.  
 
Future research on this work will include the development 
of corresponding design patterns and interfaces for cloud 
based applications to fit into the proposed deployment 
models and the investigation on integrating security 
protocols and algorithms with the proposed models to 
provide security supports at cryptography level.  
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